In 2008, the majority of U.S. airlines began charging first for one, and then, two checked bags. One of the often cited reasons for this action by the airlines' executives was that this would influence customers to travel with less baggage and thus improve cost and operational performance. A notable exception to the charging for checked bags trend was Southwest Airlines, who turned their resistance to this practice into a "Bags Fly Free" marketing campaign. Using a publicly available database of the airlines' departure performance, we investigate whether the implementation of checked bag fees really did result in better operational performance metrics. At the aggregate level we find that the airlines that began charging for one checked bag saw a significant relative improvement in their on-time departure performance in the 35-day period afterwards, compared to the airlines that were not charging for a checked bag during the same time period. However, charging a fee for both checked bags results in a worse on-time departure performance compared to charging for one checked bag. We also identify the differential impact of baggage fees on 'low-cost' versus 'legacy' carriers: the departure performance of the low-cost airlines became worse while it improved for the legacy carriers when charging for one checked bag. When the airlines began charging for two checked bags, we find no significant change in departure performance of legacy carriers, but a degradation of departure performance of low-cost carriers. Thus, our study provides empirical evidence on the influence of checked baggage fee policies on airlines' operational performance.
Introduction
The once industry standard of two 50-pound free checked bags is now virtually extinct in the domestic U.S. airline market. Today, most U.S. airlines charge fees for checking a bag.
On February 10
th 2007 Spirit Airlines, an ultra low-cost carrier, became the first airline to charge for one checked bag (i.e. the second checked bag fee), a policy that was extended to two checked bags (i.e., by adding the first checked bag fee) on June 19 th , 2007. United campaign. Transferring bags between flights under an extreme time crunch is perhaps the most challenging aspect of running an airport hub and a common cause of delays. Departure delays at Midway airport for Southwest Airlines were reported to increase after the checked baggage fee implementation by other airlines. Ryanair, an Irish low-cost airline, claims that baggage fees are a necessity in order to keep costs down, and it has been popularly hypothesized that if Southwest is going to welcome free checked bags, they have to expect higher costs (Lariviere 2011) . On the other hand, to avoid baggage fees, passengers have continued to bulk up their carry-on bags, turning the allotment of one bag and a purse or briefcase into a two-suitcase load. Some game the system by fully intending to check a bag -they volunteer at the gate instead of the counter, and thus avoid the airline fee (McCartney 2012a). Baggage fees have made the overhead bin a precious commodity and the accompanying boarding stampede can increase departure delays. Thus, whether baggage fees lead to increased departure delays for the carrier that charges fees, or does not charge fees, is an empirical question that we seek to answer.
That a firm will perform better if it links its operations strategy to the competitive strategy to achieve the so-called external fit, is well established in the operations strategy literature (Smith and Reece 1999) . Moreover, the alignment between operations and marketing strategies should exist to benefit organizational performance (Roth and Van Der Velde 1991, Rhee and Mehra 2006) . In a special issue on this topic, Malhotra and Sharma (2002, p. 210) note that "managing the interface between the marketing and operations functions is a challenging task since these two functional areas may often have conflicting objectives and plans of action. Yet co-ordination between them is critical for firm success."
Thus, the implementation of checked bag fees (a marketing decision) provides an ideal setting to study how an industry changed, or coordinated, their operations to respond to this marketing strategy change.
To empirically address the impact of baggage fees in the airline industry, we primarily use data collected by the BTS for the time periods immediately before and after fees for one and two checked bags were imposed by the majority of the U.S. airlines. We supplement this data with data published by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and the National Climatic Data Center (NCDC) of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) and use regression analyses to examine the impact of implementing checked baggage fees on departure delay performance. We collected data on 1,929,733 domestic flights flown by Continental Airlines, Delta Air Lines, Northwest Airlines, United Airlines, US Airways, American Airlines, AirTran Airways, JetBlue Airways and Southwest Airlines, starting with 35 days prior to the date when the fees for one checked bag were implemented and continuing until 35 days after the implementation of two checked bags fees. Since Southwest Airlines is the only major U.S. airline that does not charge for two checked bags, it resembles a control variable of operational performance in a quasi-experiment 3 when compared against competing airlines (that did begin charging for checked bags) that operated in the same airports.
Our focus is on the operational impact of airline baggage fees instituted by most U.S. airlines in 2008. More specifically, we seek to answer the following questions: Do baggage fees impact airline operations as measured by departure delays? Is there a differential impact of one checked bag fee and two checked bags fees policies? Did airlines increase or decrease scheduled block-times in anticipation/response to the impact of baggage fees?
3 In a true experimental study, the treatment group receives the intervention, while the control group receives the usual conditions, meaning they only receive interventions that they would have gotten if they had not participated in the study. As Southwest Airlines might have gotten new customers who used to fly the now-baggage fee charging airlines, we do not have a true experiment, and consequently we do not employ a traditional difference-in-difference approach (Card and Krueger 1994) in our analysis.
We show that, at the aggregate level, the airlines that began charging for one checked bag saw a significant relative improvement in their on-time departure performance in the 35-day period afterwards, compared to the airlines that were not charging for a checked bag during the same time period. When grouped into 'low-cost' versus 'legacy' carriers, however, we find opposite effects: the departure performance of the low-cost airlines became worse while it improved for the legacy carriers. When the airlines began charging for two checked bags, we find no significant change in departure performance of legacy carriers, but a degradation of departure performance of low-cost carriers. These findings indicate that the baggage fees did influence customer behavior, but in the case of charging for both checked bags, not in the direction the airlines had hoped for. The degradation of departure performance appears to be especially bad for the low-cost carriers, as it appears that their more price sensitive passengers may have begun carrying on more baggage to avoid the checked bag fees. Thus, our findings also support the notion that Southwest's marketing strategy of being the only major U.S. airline not charging for the first two checked bags is in line with their historical operations oriented strategy.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we briefly review the related literature on on-time performance and baggage fees. Section 3 describes the hypotheses of this study. Section 4 explains the data, variables and empirical specifications.
Section 5 presents and discusses the results, and Section 6 concludes the paper.
Literature Review
This paper relates to two streams of research in economics and operations management: (1) research that uses data provided by the DOT to investigate the impact of various factors on the quality dimension of airline's operational performance, as measured by on-time departures, on-time arrivals, and flight cancellations, and the impact of service quality dimensions on financial performance, and (2) research that examines the consequences of implementing baggage fees.
Within the first stream, economics researchers have looked at the impact of competition on airline service quality. Prince and Simon (2009) use BTS data on 10 major airlines in the 1995-2001 period on Fridays on the 1,000 busiest routes, and find that multimarket contact has a positive effect on arrival delays, causing delays on the ground, more in the form of gate departure delays rather than time spent on the runway. Using over 800,000 individual flights scheduled between 50 major U.S. airports in January, April, and July of 2000 , Mazzeo (2003 finds that the prevalence and duration of arrival delays are significantly greater on routes where only one airline provides direct service, and that weather, congestion, and scheduling decisions have a significant contribution to arrival delays.
Using over 27,000 monthly route observations between 1997 to 2000, find that less competitive routes are characterized by lower service quality, in terms of both more frequent and longer flight delays. Further, Rupp (2009) as hub origin, vertical integration with regional partners to operate flights, and Internet access on departure delays, but these factors are not relevant for our objective.
In the operations management literature, Ramdas et al. (2012) examine the relationship between performance along several dimensions of service quality, including on-time performance, long delays, and cancellations, and stock market performance, by using monthly data for eleven major U.S. airlines over a 20-year period. Lapre and Tsikriktsis (2006) use airline data to examine organizational learning curves in the airline industry. Diwas and Venkataraman (2012) perform an event study analysis, a methodology related to our paper, to examine the impact of the passage of health care laws requiring universal coverage on patient behavior. Li and Netessine (2011) consider that airline alliances provide higher service quality in the form of more options, smoother connections, shared alliance lounges, and flexibility regarding frequent flier programs. Others equate higher quality with on-time performance. For example, Ramdas and Williams (2008) investigate the tradeoff between aircraft capacity utilization and on-time performance using flights flown within the continental U.S. in the years 1995-2005. They find that greater aircraft utilization results in higher delays, with this effect being worse for airlines that are close to their asset frontiers in terms of already being at high levels of aircraft utilization. Deshpande and Arıkan (2012) examine the impact of the airline flight schedules on on-time arrival performance. They use 20,681,160 flights covering 294 U.S. airports in the years [2005] [2006] [2007] to provide a method for forecasting the scheduled on-time arrival probability for each individual scheduled domestic flight in the U.S. They find that revenue drivers, competitive measures, and operational characteristics such as the hub and spoke network structure have a significant effect on the scheduled on-time arrival probability. In addition, they find that, unlike low-cost airlines, full-service airlines assign a higher weight on the cost of late arrivals. Using the same dataset, Arıkan et al. (2012) develop stochastic models to analyze the propagation of delays through air-transportation networks. They find that the actual block times averages of all U.S. airlines exceed their average scheduled block times, potentially driven by the 15-minute buffer used by the DOT in reporting on-time arrival performance. They also construct a measure for "passenger" on-time arrival probability, in addition to the flight on-time arrival performance currently reported by the DOT. Our study contributes to this research stream by including a new possible factor that influences departure delays, i.e. charging for checked bags. More specifically, we study how a marketing strategy decision such as charging or not charging passengers for one, and respectively two checked bags, impacts airline service quality as measured by on-time departures.
Within the second research stream, Allon et al. (2011) analytically examine whether airlines should bundle the main service (i.e. transporting a person) and an ancillary service such as transporting a checked bag, and if they should post a single price or unbundle them and price the ancillary service separately. Their modeling approach indicates that the way in which airlines have been implementing baggage fees has more direct impact on controlling customer behavior than segmenting customers. Our study is the first to show empirically that baggage fees do seem to have influenced customer behavior, and that the effect depends on the type of airline. Unlike Allon et al. (2011) who posit that pricing the baggage separately induces customers to exert effort (i.e., to reduce the volume of checked baggage) and thus lowers the airline's costs, we find that this practice also induces customers to increase the volume of carry-on baggage, which does not lower the airline's costs. Using an event study methodology, Barone et al. (2012) for bags, a service that had been long built into the ticket price, they would start to lose business among the price-sensitive, non-elite frequent fliers. However, once Spirit Airlines, the "ultra-low cost airline", successfully experimented with fees for checked bags, most U.S.
Hypothesis Development
airlines followed it. The current theory does not clearly predict the effect of baggage fees on departure delays. We speculate that the imposition of baggage fees (of similar $ value for all airlines) caused passengers to change their behavior, and thus impacted departure delays, as follows:
Let x 1 and x 2 represent the percentage of passengers who travel by checking in one and two bags respectively 4 . When the airlines which previously had not charged their passengers for the first two pieces of checked baggage instituted a policy change by charging for one checked bag (see Table 2 for exact dates), the x 1 passengers were not affected. However, x 2 passengers' behavior was affected, and depending on their price sensitivity, they chose one of the following three options: (1) paying the fee for one checked bag while checking the other bag for free, (2) checking only one bag (instead of two) and thus not paying the fee, hence turning into the x 1 type of passengers, or (3) switching to a carrier which did not implement such a policy. Let y 1 , y 2 , and y 3 represent the percentage of x 2 passengers who chose the first, second and third option respectively. While y 1 and y 2 passengers did not switch to a carrier without such a baggage policy, overall they contributed to a decline in the checked baggage load of those airlines which implemented such a policy. That is, when faced with a fee for checked baggage, passengers checked 40 to 50 percent fewer bags on some carriers (U.S. Government Accountability Office 2010). Moreover, y 2 passengers may have brought on board a larger carry-on to make up for the "loss" of one bag. Indeed, checked baggage fees led to more and heavier bags brought as carry-on into the cabin (Dinkar 2010) . The existing carry-on baggage limits were not always enforced. Related to the increase of carry-on baggage, a survey of the Association of Flight Attendants show an increase in tense boarding situations, the number of checked bags at the gate and pushback delays (U.S. Government Accountability Office 2010). Consequently, the implementation of checked baggage fees resulted in reduced likelihood of on-time departures as long as the carry-on baggage limits were loosely enforced. The popular press describes the real-estate crisis in the plane through as follows:
one or two bags as long as there are no additional fees imposed by the airline. The passengers can also check more than two bags, however these extra-bags have always incurred additional fees, thus our discussion reduces to their behavior regarding the first two checked bags. Also, the passengers who are insensitive to baggage fees (e.g. elite frequent flyers, business travelers, those who do not check in bags) are not affected by the fees instituted on one or two checked bags, and thus this customer segment is irrelevant for the purpose of our study.
"For many travelers, the most odious aspect of the baggage fee is the anticipated battle for overhead-bin space. To make sure they can find room, some customers already push their way through boarding queues. Passengers struggle to stuff large bags into small bins, and flight attendants often find themselves taking bags off planes and checking them to their destinations once bins fill up. All this will likely get worse, though the airlines say that the new fee won't be collected in airplane cabins from customers who Hypothesis 1a. Better relative performance as measured by departure delays is achieved when charging for one checked bag versus not charging for a checked bag.
Hypothesis 1b. Worse relative performance as measured by departure delays is achieved when charging for one checked bag versus not charging for a checked bag.
Further, when the airlines which were charging their passengers for one checked bag instituted a policy change by charging the first two checked bags (see Table 2 for exact dates), both x 2 and x 1 passengers were affected, depending on their price sensitivity. Regarding x 2 , their y 1 subset of passengers (previously defined) faced the following options: (1) paying the fees for the first two checked bags, (2) instead of two bags, checking only one bag (thus turning into x 1 passengers) and paying for it, and potentially having a bigger carry-on bag to make up for one bag, or (3) switching to a carrier which did not implement such a policy. The y 2 subset, as previously mentioned, identifies with x 1 passengers, who have the following options: (1) checking one bag and paying for it, (2) not checking the bag as it is a carry-on bag, or (3) switching to a carrier which did not implement such a policy.
Let z represent the percentage of x 1 passengers who switch to a carrier which did not institute the above mentioned policy. If z is large, then we hypothesize that the departure delays encountered by the airlines without fees for the first two checked bags exceed the departure delays of those airlines which have a one checked bag fee policy, which in turn are larger than the departure delays of the airlines which do charge fees for the first two checked bags. Let f and g represent the percentage of x 1 passengers who pay the fee for their one checked bag and those who do not pay the fee as their bag is a carry-on. If g is large, we expect the departure delays of the airlines charging fees for the first two checked bags to be larger than the departure delays of the airlines with a single checked bag fee policy, which in turn exceeds the departure delays of the airlines without fees for the first two checked bags. Regarding the larger carry-on bag that passengers might have considered to make up for the "loss" of a free checked bag (i.e. either the second or the first checked bag), we expect passengers to exhibit a more pronounced behavior change when facing a change in baggage policy from one checked bag fee to two checked bags fees, rather than from no checked bag fee to one checked bag fee. That is, we expect an incremental impact of implementing fees for the first two checked bags over implementing fees for only one checked bag.
Similar to the one checked bag fee policy, the theory does not offer a clear direction of the impact of the first two checked bags fees policy on departure delays, and hence we let the data dictate the correct hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2a. Better relative performance as measured by departure delays is achieved when charging for the first two checked bags versus charging only for one checked bag.
Hypothesis 2b. Worse relative performance as measured by departure delays is achieved when charging for the first two checked bags versus charging only for one checked bag.
It is understood that the new policies on checked baggage, motivated by poor financial performance, required strategic decisions at the carrier level, given the unknown impact it would have on passengers and on the entire industry. As "service factories" (Schmenner 1986 ), the airlines were facing another challenge in providing their services as reliably and rapidly as possible. American Airlines declared: "[we] took extraordinary pains to prepare for the step. We did a lot of research on how our customers would be impacted. We did a lot of preparation with our airport people and our flight attendants" (Field 2009 ).
United Airlines acknowledged a potential drawback, given the exemptions accompanying the policies: "determining passengers' mileage status and ticket types could require more interaction with airline agents" (McCartney 2008c). It seems obvious that a decision of such caliber required closer coordination and communication within airlines, especially between the marketing and operations functions. Given the expected disruptions in the boarding process, we expect airlines allocate more slack in their scheduled block times 6 to make up for departure delays and still arrive on-time, according to the DOT performance metrics. However, this practice of adding minutes to schedules 7 comes at a high cost to becomes an opportunity to absorb disruption and avoid its propagation. Hence, given the previously hypothesized departure performances (i.e. both worse and better) triggered by implementing checked bags fees policies, we let the data dictate the correct hypothesis for the impact of these policies on the scheduled block time:
Hypothesis 3a. As the checked baggage fee policy gets implemented from zero to one to two bags, the scheduled block time increases.
Hypothesis 3b. As the checked baggage fee policy gets implemented from zero to one to two bags, the scheduled block time decreases.
4. Methods
Data and Variables
The main data source is BTS' Airline On-Time Performance data, which includes flight information of all major U.S. airlines that have at least 1 percent of total domestic scheduled-service passenger revenues. The data cover nonstop scheduled-service flights between points within the U.S., and include detailed departure and arrival statistics by airport and airline, such as: scheduled and actual departure and arrival times, departure and arrival delays, origin and destination airports, flight numbers, flight date, one-hour time block based on the scheduled departure/arrival time (e.g. 6:00am-6:59am), cancelled or diverted flights, taxi-out and taxi-in times, air time, tail number of the aircraft that flew the flight etc. Thus, our unit of analysis is an individual flight from its origin airport to the destination airport operated by its carrier on a given day at a particular time.
An ideal setup for understanding how the implementation of checked bags fees affects departure performance would be an experiment where, for the same time period and at the same airports, some airlines charge their passengers for their baggage while others do not.
Because we focus only on the airports used by Southwest Airlines, which did not impose fees on the first two checked bags (unless they exceeded the maximum weight limit), our research employs a quasi-experiment that approximates the ideal setting. For our comparison set, we included all U.S. airlines with greater than $2B in annual revenues in 2008, i.e.
Continental Airlines, Delta Air Lines, Northwest Airlines, United Airlines, US Airways, American Airlines, JetBlue Airways 8 and AirTran Airways. All but AirTran Airways are considered "legacy" U.S. airlines (airlines that were operating before the deregulation of the industry in 1978). Notably, for our purposes, we use Southwest Airlines to approximate the ideal setup where some randomly selected flights encounter fees for two pieces of baggage whereas others do not and thus constitute the "control" group. In our study, Southwest flights act as a pseudo-control for trends and unobservable factors that can also affect flight delays in addition to baggage fees and other observable factors such as congestion. For a meaningful comparison, we restricted our analysis to the 57 origin airports used simultaneously by Southwest Airlines and one or more of the other airlines (see Table   1 ). These airports constitute a representative sample of Southwest's airports, i.e. 89% of the total number of airports used by Southwest in 2008. To examine the impact of charging for one checked bag, we selected the flights in the 35-day period preceding and the 35-day period following the implementation of one checked bag fee by the specific airline. A 35-day window guarantees four occurrences of the same day of a week, and is large enough to provide an adequate sample size but small enough to isolate the impact of the baggage fee policies. Table 2 To study the impact of two checked bags fees, we selected the flights of all the airlines For our flight-level datasets, we used data from several sources such as the BTS 9 , the FAA 10 , and the NCDC 11 websites. Since most airports are weather reporting stations, for each origin and destination airports we collected data on daily precipitation level and average daily wind speed from the NCDC. Additional variables were computed as well (see Table 3 ). All the variables in our datasets are described next.
Explanatory Variable
Checked bag fee. The Bag-Fee ordinal variable indicates the status of each flight in our datasets with regards to the checked bag fee policy of the airline that flew the flight. Thus, Difference between the actual departure time and the scheduled departure time of flight i, adjusted for the spillover from the previous flight in an aircraft rotation.
Scheduled-Block-T ime i
Difference between the scheduled arrival time and the scheduled departure time of flight i. Actual-T urnAround-T ime i Turn-around duration between the actual departure time of flight i and the actual arrival time of the previous flight in an aircraft rotation (not applicable to the first flight in an aircraft rotation).
Route i
Origin-destination airports pair of flight i.
Origin i
Origin airport of flight i.
Carrier i
Airline that flew flight i.
M onth i
Month of flight i.
Day of week of flight i.
Dep-T ime-Block i
One-hour time block based on the scheduled departure time (e.g., 6:00am-6:59am) of flight i.
Arr-T ime-Block i
One-hour time block based on the scheduled arrival time of flight i.
Dep-Congestion i
Number of flights scheduled to depart between 45 minutes before and 15 minutes after the scheduled departure time of flight i.
Arr-Congestion i
Number of flights scheduled to arrive between 45 minutes before and 15 minutes after the scheduled arrival time of flight i.
Aircraf t-Age i
Age of the aircraft that flew flight i.
Avg-P assengers i
Expected number of passengers on the aircraft that flew flight i.
Origin-P rcp i
Precipitation level at the origin airport on the day of flight i (tenths of mm).
Dest-P rcp i
Precipitation level at the destination airport on the day of flight i (tenths of mm).
Origin-Awnd i
Average wind speed at the origin airport on the day of flight i (tenths of meters per second).
Dest-Awnd i
Average wind speed at the destination airport on the day of flight i (tenths of meters) per second).
Bag-F ee=1 indicates a flight with the one checked bag fee policy implemented by the specific airline on that specific date, whereas Bag-F ee=0 indicates the absence of such policy, i.e. no checked bag fee policy is implemented by the airline. Further, Bag-F ee=2
indicates a flight with the first two checked bags fees policy implemented by the airline on that specific date. Thus, the variable Bag-Fee has three levels, and we estimate two coefficients (for Bag-F ee=1 and Bag-F ee=2 ) in our regression.
Dependent Variables
Spillover-adjusted departure delay. According to BTS, the departure performance is based on departure from the gate. The departure delay is given by the difference between the actual departure time and CRS departure time. In case the actual departure occurs prior to the scheduled departure, the departure delay becomes zero as a negative departure delay does not represent a "true" delay. Also, a delay on one flight can potentially spillover, or propagate, to the next flight since any given aircraft for an airline typically flies multiple flights over the course of a day. Therefore, our main dependent variable is spilloveradjusted departure delay (SpAdj-Departure-Delay), which we computed for each flight i in our datasets by subtracting any late aircraft delay from the previous flight i − 1 in the aircraft's rotation, from the departure delay of flight i. This eliminates the serial correlation between observations in our dataset induced by consecutive flights using a common aircraft routing.
To calculate the spillover, we follow Arıkan et al. (2012)'s approach. Thus, we consider the sequence of flights operated by a particular tail number as an aircraft rotation. More specifically, an aircraft's rotation begins with the first revenue flight after a major maintenance, or a layover of more than five hours at an airport, and ends with the last flight operated before the aircraft returns for its next maintenance or remains on the ground for several hours. A snapshot of one such aircraft rotation flown by Southwest Airlines' aircraft with tail number N208WN is shown in Table 4 . We computed the minimum time to turn an aircraft (T i ) by analyzing ground times at different airports for different types of aircraft for each airline. First, we grouped the actual ground-times for each flight flown in 2008 by airline, aircraft model, and departure airport.
We then computed the 5 th percentile value (in minutes) across all actual ground-times for each airline, aircraft model, and departure airport combination. Additionally, we calculated the 5 th percentile value (in minutes) of actual ground-times for each airline-aircraft model and airline-departure airport combinations. For the minimum time to turn an aircraft (T i ), we used one of these 5 th percentile values instead of the original one in case the original turn-time variable was obtained from very few flights (i.e., less than 20 observations) or was very high (i.e., more than 90 minutes). Further, the buffer time available on ground for flight i, B i , is calculated by subtracting T i from G i for all flights except the first flight on the rotation. The B i value of the first flight of any rotation is assumed to be zero. Thus, the spillover, L i , from flight i − 1 to flight i is given by
Therefore, we computed the spillover-adjusted departure delay of a given flight by subtracting the spillover from the previous flight in the aircraft's rotation, from the departure delay: 
Controls
Typical factors that influence departure delays are seasonal (e.g. passenger load factor, weather, etc.), daily propagation related (e.g. late arriving crew, late arriving aircraft, connecting passengers from late incoming flights, air traffic congestion), and random (e.g. mechanical problems, baggage problems, security delays) (Tu et al. 2008) . Since June 2003, the airlines that report on-time data to the BTS also report the causes of delays 13 for their 13 The causes of delays are reported in the following broad categories: air carrier, extreme weather, National Aviation System (NAS), late-arriving aircraft, and security. To obtain total weather-related delays, we combined the extreme weather delays and the NAS weather category, with the weather-related delays included in the "late-arriving aircraft" category (calculated as per the BTS methodology). flights. Figure 1 shows, for example, the flight delays by cause in the year 2008, across all U.S. airports. The weather shows up as the main source of delays, followed by air carrier delay (e.g. maintenance or crew problems, aircraft cleaning, baggage loading, fueling, etc.), aircraft arriving late, National Aviation System (e.g. airport operations, heavy traffic volume, air traffic control, etc.), and lastly, security delay. However, a shortcoming of the Airline On-Time Performance data is that the source of delay cannot distinguish between origin and destination airports. By using individual flight level congestion and weather related control variables at the origin and destination airports, and spilloveradjusted departure delay as dependent variable, we do control for the main drivers of flight delays. Hence, our conclusions related to baggage fees and departure delays are robust,
given that we used the following control variables:
Route. The Route variable captures all the fixed effects of an origin-destination pair for each flight.
Origin. The Origin variable controls for unobserved origin airport specific effects such as maintenance facilities, airport capacity, etc. that can potentially affect flight departure.
Carrier. The Carrier variable denotes the airline that flew the flight, and controls for airline specific effects. Age of aircraft. As the tail number is an unique identifier for each aircraft, we used it to collect the aircraft's year of manufacturing from the Aircraft Registry Database hosted by FAA. Hence, we were able to compute the age of the aircraft as of year 2008.
Average number of passengers. The uniqueness of the tail number also offers information on the number of seats of each aircraft, as per the Aircraft Registry Database. We multiplied this seating capacity by the load factor we collected from BTS' T-100 Domestic Segment (U.S. Carriers). As the load factor is the monthly proportion of total seats that were actually filled for an airline on a specific route, we were able to compute the average number of passengers on each flight, thus controlling for the demand for air travel. A summary of descriptive statistics of the continuous variables used in our analysis is presented in Table 5 . Let y i represent the time when a flight i is ready for take-off and let CRSdeparture i represent the scheduled departure time shown in the carrier's CRS. Then, departure delay is:
However, y i is a latent variable and DepartureDelay i is the observed variable. Hence, a
Tobit regression model is appropriate here. Moreover, standard regression techniques (OLS) provide inconsistent parameter estimates when applied to a large number of observations in the sample equal to the lower bound for the dependent variable (Greene 2007) . In the Tobit model, which uses the maximum likelihood estimation, the statistical significance of individual parameter estimates is evaluated by Wald Chi-square tests which replace the t-tests in OLS.
The estimation model of the impact of the checked bag fees on the spillover-adjusted departure delay is shown in (1). We use the first dataset to differentiate between the effects of charging for one checked bag (Bag-F ee=1), respectively not charging for a checked bag (Bag-F ee=0), and label this model Tobit1. In addition, to concurrently disentangle the effects of charging for the first two checked bags (Bag-F ee=2), only charging for one checked bag (Bag-F ee=1), and not charging for a checked bag (Bag-F ee=0), we use the second dataset and label the model Tobit2.
SpAdj-Departure-Delay
To analyze the impact of Bag-Fee on Scheduled-Block-Time, we use the second dataset to test Model 2, an OLS regression model (labeled OLS1) as Scheduled-Block-Time is not affected by censoring. Given that the scheduled block time is typically determined several months in advance based on the estimates of the time it takes to complete each flight , the model does not include weather related variables.
Scheduled-Block-Time
5. Results and Discussion
Spillover-Adjusted Departure Delay
The results of the estimation of our Tobit1 model are shown in Table 6 14 . The coefficient for the Bag-Fee indicator variable which indicates one checked bag fee as being implemented, is negative and statistically significant (-1.8701; p<0.0001). This indicates that when the flights encounter departure delays, the implementation of one checked bag fees reduces SpAdj-Departure-Delay by 1.8701 minutes (when a delay occurs) versus no implementation of these fees. In other words, the airlines that implemented the fee for one checked bag saw their departure performance improve, whereas Southwest Airlines experienced a negative impact on its departure performance. We thus find support for Hypothesis 1A, and consequently reject Hypothesis 1B. The coefficients for the categorical variables for
Origin, Route, Carrier, Month, Day-of-Week, Dep-Time-Block, and Arr-Time-Block are not reported to conserve space, although they are statistically significant. Table 6 also shows that the other control variables, except Avg-Passengers, are statistically significant. Note. Standard errors are shown in parantheses. The number of observations used is different from the first dataset sample size due to missing values of Aircraft-Age, Avg-Passengers, Origin-Prcp, Dest-Prcp, Origin-Awnd, and Dest-Awnd variables. ***p < 0.0001; **p < 0.01; *p < 0.05; + p < 0.1
Our study suggests that in the 35-day period following the date of implementing fees for one checked bag, the airlines that did implement these fees experienced improved relative performance in terms of their departure delays. We expect that the price-insensitive passengers or those passengers traveling with only one checked bag were indifferent to this policy change. The same policy may have determined a change in other passengers' behavior in the sense that fewer passengers may have checked a second bag while still flying their preferred airline. Another possible explanation is that price-sensitive customers of those airlines that charged for one checked bag started flying Southwest instead. While it is obvious that additional passengers generate additional revenues for an airline, it is less obvious that more passengers represent an increased likelihood of departure delays.
One indication of this relationship comes from AirTran Airways' Senior VP who openly declared that it is sometimes better to delay a flight to wait for passengers or baggage (McCartney 2010b). Thus, the more passengers, the higher the probability of a delayed pushback. Table 7 lists the Tobit2 estimation results 15 . The coefficient for the Bag-Fee variable which indicates the one checked bag fee as being implemented, is negative and marginally significant (-0.4443; p<0.1), whereas the coefficient for the Bag-Fee variable corresponding to implementing two checked bag fees, is positive and statistically significant (0.6229; p<0.05). That is, when the flights encounter departure delays, the implementation of two checked bag fees has triggered an additional increase in SpAdj-Departure-Delay relative to the implementation of only one checked bag fees of 1.0672 minutes. We reject Hypothesis 2A as we find support for Hypothesis 2B. Similar to Table 6 , the coefficients for the categorical variables for Origin, Route, Carrier, Month, Day-of-Week, Dep-Time-Block, and Arr-Time-Block are not shown in the interest of space, although they are statistically significant. As seen in Table 7 , the other control variables are also statistically significant.
Thus, when examining departure delays over a longer period of time covering the time periods around the implementation dates of one checked bag and two checked bags fees policies, the fee for one checked bag showed the same impact as previously described.
Moreover, the implementation of two checked bags fees policy indicated worse departure performance relative to the implementation of only one checked bag fee, as well as relative to not charging for checked bags. Our finding can be explained by the fact that Table 9 19 show positive and statistically significant coefficients of Bag-Fee variable for both one checked bag fee and two checked bags fees policies, for Low-Cost Carriers. Thus, it appears that JetBlue and AirTran Airways passengers were more likely to carry their previously checked bags on board. This in turn increases the likelihood of a delayed departure, especially considering the loose enforcement of carry-on rules leading to traffic jams while boarding.
While citing Boeing's discovery that boarding times had doubled over the last two decades, Mouawad (2011) has recently argued that "[c]hecked-baggage fees have only added to the problem, because travelers now take more roll-ons onboard, blocking the isles as they try to cram their belongings into any available space". Moreover, this practice increases Note. Standard errors are shown in parantheses. The number of observations used is different from the dataset sample size due to missing values of Aircraft-Age, Avg-Passengers, Origin-Prcp, Dest-Prcp, Origin-Awnd, and Dest-Awnd variables. ***p < 0.0001; **p < 0.01; *p < 0.05; + p < 0.1 the likelihood of lack of overhead space, which in turn leads to "bags that need to be checked at the last minute -a common cause of delayed flights." On the other hand, Table 9 shows negative coefficients of the same variable, and thus indicates that American Airlines, Continental Airlines, Delta Airlines, Northwest Airlines, United Airlines, and US Airways passengers were less price sensitive and did not change their behavior to carry on more bags as the low-cost carriers customers appear to have. 
Scheduled Block Time
The results of the OLS1 regression estimates for each airline's scheduled block times are shown in Table 10 . The coefficient of Bag-Fee corresponding to one checked bag fee is not significant, whereas the coefficient of Bag-Fee corresponding to the first two checked bags fees is negative and statistically significant (-0.3796; p<0.0001), providing partial support for Hypothesis H3b. These results indicate that any anticipated change in departure performance due to one checked bag fee policy was not originally captured in airlines' scheduled block times. The airlines were not able to capture it as they typically schedule the block times about six months in advance that airlines decreased the scheduled block times and, given the longer time span over which the first two checked bags fees policy was implemented, the effect is captured in our results. We thus have an indication that the operations managers of these airlines may have acted proactively to the marketing decision to impose fees for checked bags, but they did so in the wrong direction as their departure delay performance actually decreased.
Robustness Checks
To rule out the possibility that our results are driven by other factors within the air- This incremental effect is also consistent with the incremental effect caused by the two checked bags fees policy on SpAdj-Departure-Delay. Because our model includes a rich set of control variables, we are able to explain about 38% of the variation in Actual-TurnAroundTime variable.
As another robustness check, we conducted a paired t-test by comparing the delay differences experienced by the airlines that implemented the one checked bag fee against the delay differences encountered by Southwest Airlines within the same time windows at the corresponding airports. For each airport-airline combination, we calculated the departure delay averages in the 30-day period preceding (the Before period) and the 30-day period following (the After period) the implementation of the one checked bag fee policy by the specific airline. Thus, for each airport, we calculated the average difference in the departure delays, i.e. average delay in the After period minus average delay in the Before period. Further, for comparison purposes we paired the departure delay difference experienced by an airline at a particular airport with the departure delay difference experienced by Southwest at the same airport. We computed relative weighted averages for non-Southwest airlines group and Southwest, by deriving the relative market shares from the absolute market Note. Standard errors are shown in parantheses. The number of observations used is different from the second dataset sample size due to missing values of Actual-TurnAround-Time, Aircraft-Age and Avg-Passengers variables. ***p < 0.0001; **p < 0.01; *p < 0.05; + p < 0.1 shares of airlines within each airport as calculated by the number of flights completed. To examine whether there is a difference in departure delays across the two groups, we performed a paired t-test, whose difference of -3.68 minutes was statistically significant with a p-value < 0.05. Thus, Southwest Airlines experienced a greater difference in departure delays between the After and Before periods than the other airlines, at the 57 airports.
That is, the airline that did not implement one checked bag fees encountered a greater relative average departure delay than the airlines that imposed fees on one checked bag.
We did not conduct a similar test for the first two checked bags fees, as the airlines started charging these fees over a longer time horizon (see Tabel 2), which makes it difficult to isolate an unique effect of this policy using this technique. Nor did we include JetBlue in this test, for the same reasons we did not include it in the Tobit1 regression. However, this test adds support to our Tobit1 regression results.
Conclusions
While investigating whether the social planner would let bags fly free, Allon et al. (2011) argue that "baggage fees are not just about revenue. They serve to alter consumer behavior in a manner that is beneficial to both the firm and customers. The firm enjoys lower costs and passes some of these savings on to customers". Our study provides empirical evidence that the checked baggage fee policies did alter passengers' behavior, yet in a different way than previously postulated. While the reduction in the number of checked bags may indeed have resulted in savings due to lower labor costs for handling checked bags, our findings suggest that the resulting increase in the quantity of bags carried-on may have had a detrimental effect on the airline's costs through a decrease in their on-time departure performance. As is the case with many incentives and penalties, finding the right amount for each that results in a positive change in customers' behavior is a complex task. Our findings highlight factors, such as the effect of carry-on bags, that need to be incorporated in designing incentive schemes.
Our research also sheds some light on the decisions made by a very operationally focused airline. When the other airlines started charging for one checked bag, Southwest Airlines' decision to not charge for bags went against their high operational service level strategy as their relative departure delay performance initially decreased. When the other airlines began charging for the first two checked bags, however, Southwest's decision appears to be in line with their strategy. While bags may not really "fly free" in an operational sense at Southwest, not charging passengers for checking bags does seem to help avoid the worst carry-on abuses seen at other airlines that have led to a degradation of on-time departure performance. This degradation seems to be especially pronounced for low cost airlines. Southwest is currently faced with this decision again as it has recently merged with AirTran Airways, an airline that currently charges for checked bags. Thus, for a company like Southwest Airlines which has a long history of being one of the best in its industry for operational performance and customer satisfaction, the decision of not charging AirTran Airways' passengers for the first two checked bags appears to be in line with their operational strategy.
Ultimately, operations managers need to be involved in the discussions about marketing initiatives such as this one to evaluate the operational impact of marketing initiatives. We have an indication that this occurred at some level as our results support the argument that after initially observing little performance decline, the airlines felt the need to shorten their scheduled block times. In hindsight, however, this may not have been the right decision given the performance deterioration observed after they began charging for the two checked bags.
Increased boarding times as a result of baggage fees have financial implications as well.
In 2005 Southwest estimated that, if its boarding times increased by 10 minutes per flight, it would need 40 more planes at a cost of $40 million each to fly the same number of flights (Lewis and Lieber 2005) . When other airlines started charging for one bag, our analysis shows an impact of increased departure delays of 1.87 minutes per flight for Southwest, resulting in an estimated financial impact of approximately $40 million per year 21 . We speculate that Southwest now achieves savings of similar magnitude after other airlines implemented the first two checked bags fee policy. As Southwest completes its merger with AirTran Airways, they face a difficult decision of whether to keep the baggage fee policy in place at AirTran or convert them to their no baggage fee policy. Our research shows that this decision is more nuanced than it may first appear. As of this writing, Southwest has decided to keep the baggage fee policy at AirTran in place for the short term. Our research helps shed light on some of the tradeoffs involved in this decision.
